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Ethics and Professionalism
in the Digital Age
A Symposium of the
Mercer Law Review
November 6, 2008
Dinner Speech
Whatever Happened to the
Search for Truth?
PROFESSOR LONGAN: It is my great honor to introduce our
speaker tonight, Professor Monroe Freedman of the Hofstra University
School of Law. I doubt there is anyone in the room tonight who is not
familiar with Professor Freedman and his work. All I intend to do by
way of introduction is mention one of his many honors and then read for
you a few comments about his work from others in the field.
In 1998 Professor Freedman received the Michael Franck Award, the
ABA's highest award for professionalism. The ABA Center for Professional Responsibility created the Michael Franck Award for Professional
Responsibility to acknowledge "individuals whose contributions in the
area of lawyers' professional responsibility set an example of insight into
the demands of legal professionalism, dedication to the highest level of
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ethical conduct, and a vision of constant improvement of lawyer
regulation in the public interest."' Professor Freedman received the
award in recognition of"a lifetime of original and influential scholarship
in the field of lawyers' ethics."2
To give you some perspective on his influence, here are a few
comments from his peers:
- Professor Ronald Rotunda: "If we had to pick the one person
who first created modem legal ethics as a serious academic
specialty, it would be Monroe Freedman."
. Larry Fox: Professor Freedman is "the conscience of our
profession."
. William Simon: "Suppose you had to pick the two most
influential events in the recent emergence of ethics as a subject of
serious reflection by the bar. Most likely, you would name the
Watergate affair of 1974 and the appearance a few years earlier of
an article by Monroe Freedman .... Of the two events, Watergate
is the most famous, but.., the least important."
. And finally, from Alan Dershowitz: "I regard [Monroe
Freedman] as the Holmes and Brandeis of Legal Ethics."3
Please join me in welcoming to Macon and to Mercer, Professor
Monroe Freedman.
PROFESSOR FREEDMAN: Thank you very much, Professor
Longan, for the generous introduction.
In a recent case, Gutman v. Klein,4 the court ordered the defendant
to turn over his laptop so that it could be copied by the plaintiff's lawyer
and an expert. When the lawyer and the expert arrived at the appointed
time, there was a two-hour delay. When they finally got the laptop, they
found that it was hot to the touch and was missing a screw from the
hard-drive plate, which made them suspicious.
As a result, the court ordered its own expert to examine the laptop.
The court's expert found that numerous files had been deleted and were
unrecoverable, and also that there were numerous modifications in
documents that were on the laptop. Accordingly, the judge entered a
default judgment against that defendant for spoliation of evidence and
ordered that attorney's fees be given by the defendant to the plaintiff for
the time involved. One of the things that the judge said Was, "It is

1. httpJ/www.abanet.orgcpr/awards/home.html.
2. http://www.abanet.orgcpr/awards/mfranckwinner_bios.html#freedman.
3. All of these quotes are from httpJ/Iaw.hostra.edu/pd/Directory/Faculty/FulTime
Faculty/ftfacjmfreedman-vitaepdf.
4. No. 03CV1570(BMC) (RML), 2008 WL 4682208 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 2008).
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impossible to know what [plaintiffs] would have found if [defendants]
and [their] counsel had complied with their discovery obligations. " '
Well, assume a similar situation, but that the spoliation is not
discovered because of a court-ordered production but instead because the
defendant sent discovery materials to the plaintiff in which metadata
revealed exactly the same thing, or that a misdirected fax revealed the
same kind of thing. There are a number of court opinions and ethics
opinions in this area, and a large number of them apply an exclusionary
rule to the metadata or to the misdirected fax. The decision of a large
number of these opinions is that the receiving lawyer cannot read the
fax or the metadata, must advise the sender that it was received, must
return it, and may not use it.
As a practical matter, however, the case of the metadata or of the
misdirected fax is indistinguishable from Gutman v. Klein, where courtordered discovery revealed that the defendant had concealed information
through spoliation. Nevertheless, the majority of ethics opinions and
court decisions would exclude the evidence of spoliation discovered
through examination of metadata or through the errant fax. And the
reasoning of those opinions is striking. There is discussion of attorneyclient confidentiality. There is discussion of dishonesty-that is, on the
part of the receiving lawyer who uses the information. There is
discussion of prejudice to the administration of justice. There is
discussion of professionalism, sometimes expressed as what goes around
comes around-professionalism there being a euphemism for putting the
interest of yourself and your fellow lawyer ahead of your client's
interests. That is, if you use what another lawyer has sent you through
carelessness, then another lawyer some day is going to do the same
thing to you. It's therefore not in your interest to use evidence of
spoliation or the smoking gun document that indicates some other kind
of fraud on the other side.
However, there is almost no discussion whatsoever about the
recipient's fiduciary obligation to his or her own client. Nor is there
discussion about the lawyer's obligation of loyalty to the client, despite
the fact that the model rules say that loyalty is an essential element in
the lawyer's relationship to the client. Moreover, very few of these
dozens of ethics opinions and judicial opinions talk about the importance
of truth in the system of administration of justice. That is why the title
to my talk is, "What Ever Happened to the Search for Truth?" One
exception, however, is an article by David Hricik in 2006 in which part

5. Id. at *12 (alterations in original) (quoting Metro. Opera Ass'n v. Local 100, Hotel
Employee's & Rest. Employees Intl Union, 212 F.R.D. 178, 230 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)).
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of the title is: "I Can Tell When You're Telling Lies."' But what follows
from that? Too often what follows from that is: "But I can't tell anybody
about it." Does that make sense?
As a preliminary to talking about the search for truth and the
importance of the search for truth in what we are going to be talking
about at the Symposium is that none of these opinions or decisions
makes any reference to the fact that the lawyer is the client's agent. Yet
a truism that is universally recognized is that the lawyer is the client's
agent. To understand my point, take an actual case, where a defense
lawyer in a personal injury case checked his voice mail one morning and
found on it a message from the plaintiff himself, who thought he was
calling his own lawyer but had mistakenly called the defense lawyer.
What the plaintiff said was, "Is it okay if I shoot some baskets with the
guys? I thought I should ask you because you got so angry with me
when I went bowling."
Now, does anybody have any question about whether that admission
by the plaintiff can be used? Why is it different, then, if the same kind
of information comes in a misdirected e-mail or in metadata that has
been mined, or in a misdirected fax from the lawyer for the plaintiff
saying, for example, "I understand you went bowling. If you ever do
anything like that again, you're going to have to find another lawyer.
I have told you that they are going to be watching and we can't afford
to have them catch you." Why should that not be useable just as much
as when it comes from the client, from the principal, himself?
Take a United States Supreme Court decision in a death penalty case.
The case was Coleman v. Thompson.! The defendant's court-appointed
lawyer filed the Virginia notice of appeal seventy-two hours late because
the lawyer miscalculated the time. The Virginia courts acknowledged
that the notice of appeal was purely ministerial, that the late filing was
no doubt inadvertent, and that the defendant had not understandably
and knowingly waived his right to appeal. Nevertheless, the Virginia
Supreme Court refused to allow the defendant to raise eleven alleged
constitutional errors before ordering that he be put to death.
Because of that decision, the United States Supreme Court held that
Coleman could not raise his constitutional issues. Why? Because under
the Restatement of Agency, section 242-which deals with the master
being subject to liability for harm caused by the negligent conduct of the
servant within the scope of employment-the defendant was bound by
his lawyer's error, by his lawyer's negligence. So Coleman, the

6. David Hricik, I Can Tell When You're Telling Lies: Ethics and Embedded
ConfidentialInformation, 30 J. LEGAL PROF. 79 (2006).
7. 501 U.S. 722 (1991).
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defendant, sitting in prison, was the master, and his court-appointed
lawyer was his servant. Accordingly, when his court-appointed lawyer
was negligent, Coleman was responsibile as the master. Thus, the
Supreme Court found that the lawyer's status as agent justified putting
the client to death without consideration of his constitutional rights.
In view of that, should not the lawyer's agency support truth in the
system over exclusion of truthful evidence? I have read no less than
sixty United States Supreme Court decisions in which the Court has
emphasized the importance of the search for truth in trials. Justice
Scalia said that the purchase price of the exclusion of reliable and
probative evidence is derogatory to the search for truth, and that the
victim of the exclusion of such reliable and trustworthy evidence is likely
to be some individual who is prevented from proving a valid claim or
who is prevented from establishing a valid defense.' And this, he said,
is offensive to "those who love justice" because courts that exclude the
truth "become themselves the instruments of wrong."9
Similarly, Justice White wrote, "After all, a... trial is not a game or
a sport. '[Tihe very nature of a trial [ius a search for truth.'"'0 I take
the importance of truth in the system seriously, although I know that
there are things that trump truth. However, I do not understand why
we should overlook or exclude reliable, trustworthy, probative evidence
because it has been obtained through mining of metadata or through a
misdirected e-mail.
In the name of truth, the Supreme Court has even condoned government officers lying to defense lawyers. For example, in Moran v.
Burbine," the authorities told the defense lawyer who wanted to see
her client that she did not have to see him that evening because her
client would not be interrogated that night. The defendant did not know
that his lawyer was trying to see him, and he was not told. Within an
hour, the authorities began a series of interrogations that went through
the night-directly contradicting what they had told the defendant's
lawyer. They did get a Miranda waiver but they got it from somebody
who did not know that his lawyer wanted to see him, and who did not
know that there had been a promise that he would not be interrogated.
The Supreme Court was very upset about this, decrying the objectionable
ethics of "deliberate[ly] misleading ...

an officer of the court.""

8. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
9. Id. at 19.
10. Matthews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 71 (1988) (White, J., dissenting)
(alterations in original) (quoting Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 166 (1986)).
11. 475 U.S. 412 (1986).
12. Id. at 424.
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Nevertheless, the Court allowed the confession, in the name of the
search for truth.
Similarly, in Nix v. Williams, 3 the police promised the lawyer that
they would not interrogate the client when they were transporting him
to another city, and on that assurance the lawyer let them transport the
prisoner without his being present. What then resulted, of course, was
interrogation during the trip. Again, the Supreme Court allowed the
fruit of that illicit interrogation, emphasizing the "enormous societal cost
of excluding truth ...

in the administration of justice." 4 The Court

explained that there is no support for excluding reliable, truthful,
probative evidence, even when it is the result of lying to the officer of the
Court. To exclude the evidence, the Court said, would be a "formalistic,
pointless, and punitive approach," 5 and the Court again stressed the
"integrity of the trial process."'
Now, in the face of the balance that has been repeatedly struck by the
Supreme Court in favor of the integrity of the trial process; that is-the
search for truth despite illicit conduct, misleading conduct, even
deliberate lying to obtain evidence-doesn't it seem incongruous to
exclude the use of truthful, probative, reliable evidence because it was
obtained through a misdirected e-mail or fax or through the mining of
metadata? Yet there are numerous holdings and articles saying that to
read a misdirected fax or e-mail or to mine metadata is dishonest, and
that the evidence obtained must be excluded from the search for truth.
Finally, one finds a recurring theme in the articles, in the opinions,
and in the ethics decisions that to allow evidence obtained from a
misdirected fax seems at odds with a profession that puts such a high
value on confidentiality and the attorney-client privilege. Now, think
about that for just a moment. To allow the evidence that is sent by the
lawyer on one side to the lawyer on the other side is at odds with the
high value of confidentiality and the attorney-client privilege. That is
a non sequitur. The attorney-client privilege, the work product doctrine,
and attorney-client confidentiality, those are between the sending lawyer
and his own client. There is no attorney-client privilege or attorneyclient confidentiality going from the recipient lawyer and her adversary's
client. The receiving lawyer does have, with regard to her own client,
an obligation of loyalty, but she does not have a duty of confidentiality
to her adversary's client.

13.

467 U.S. 431 (1984).

14. Id. at 445.
15. Id.
16.

Id. at 447.
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Of course, it is all right if lawyers want to have agreements between
them that metadata will not be mined or that misdirected e-mails will
not be used. However, it is constantly overlooked that this is not the
lawyer's unilateral decision to make-this is a decision that must be
made by the client. This is part of a lawyer's obligation to communicate
to the client anything that is material to the representation. And it is
up to the client, not the lawyer, to make that decision. Indeed, the
lawyers would have conflicts of interest in making the decision
themselves.
If the client agrees, that's fine, but what if the client says, "Look, I'm
being completely open in this case. But I know my adversary. He's a
crook. That's what this is all about. So, if you send something by
mistake to the other side, I don't care, because I have no secrets. But we
might receive evidence of his fraud. So no, I don't agree with that." The
client's decision should be controlling.
Although I have strong views in favor of confidentiality, I agree with
those courts which have held that if confidentiality is not protected like
the crown jewels, it is lost. This was applied, for example, in a case
where an investigator for one side went at night to the dumpster behind
the building of the adverse lawyer, went through the trash in the
dumpster, and found some attorney-client privileged material that was
extremely important. The court allowed the evidence to be used, saying
it had been abandoned, saying that it had not been treated like the
crown jewels.
That means, at least in crown-jewels jurisdictions, that the attorneyclient privilege can be waived. And that means, in turn, that a lawyer
with a fiduciary obligation, with an obligation of loyalty, with an
obligation of zealous representation, has no choice but to use that
information unless the client agrees that it should not be used. Again,
it is the client's decision, not the lawyer's decision.
I believe that the recipient lawyer should read the document, that the
recipient lawyer should withhold the fact that she has it until it is
tactically desirable to use it in a deposition or in cross-examination at
trial, and that the recipient lawyer should not tell the other lawyer,
"You'd better prepare your client, because otherwise I've got some
information that he's going to be very embarrassed about."
I get calls from lawyers who want to know what to do with a
misdirected fax or e-mail. When that happens, that lawyer is my client.
The lawyer who calls me to ask for advice is my client. My view of how
the issue ought to be resolved is not my client, and that lawyer's client
is not my client. In two cases, a box of documents was sent to a lawyer
by a disgruntled employee on the other side. What I suggested was that
the lawyer use me as a screen. I went through the documents to
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determine whether there was anything that was useful to the case and
found that there was nothing. So we resealed the box and sent it back.
In each case, that resolved the issue.
On the other hand, if I had found anything useful in the box, or if the
lawyer had read something useful in an e-mail, then my recommendation would be that the lawyer forward the document to the court
accompanied by a memorandum of law explaining why the information
is important to the search for truth and why the lawyer should be
permitted to use it. That way, regardless of how the court decides, at
least the court knows about the information and the lawyer has carried
out her obligations to her client in a reasonably safe way.
However, I also add that if the lawyer wants to be absolutely secure,
she should call up the lawyer on the other side and tell him that you
have it, ask him what he wants you to do with it, and then you do that.
That is the safest thing to do. I do not think you have to go that far. I
think it is safe enough to send it to the court with a memo, but that's my
lawyer-client's decision.
PROFESSOR LONGAN: We will take just a minute if anybody has
any questions for Professor Freedman; we can certainly entertain those.
AUDIENCE QUESTION: Professor Freedman, I think the ABA
agrees with your reading based on its opinion on metadata, but you are
a professor who teaches in New York. So, if you counsel a New York Bar
member, where the New York Bar has come out the other way in
suggesting that metadata is inadvertently disclosed, would you give the
same advice to somebody who is a member of the New York Bar?
PROFESSOR FREEDMAN: Yes, but I do tell that person that there
is such a decision and that that creates an element of risk. Of course,
what the New York State Bar Committee says is not binding on the
disciplinary committee, and it is certainly not binding on the court. So
I still think it is safe enough to send the document to the court. In fact,
it's something that I have done in an analogous context. I told the court,
"Your Honor, I'm a moral stakeholder. I have obligations to my client
and to the search for truth. At the same time, I might have an
obligation not to use this. Therefore, I am asking you. I will do
whatever you tell me to do. Here is the document. This is why it is
important to my case. And this is why the New York State Bar
Association is wrong. But whatever you decide, Your Honor, that is
what I am going to do."
That is not ideal because, of course, the other side gets a copy of the
memo, gets a copy of the attachments and so you give them the
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opportunity to coach their client. That bothers me. But again, that is a
reasonably safe course.
AUDIENCE QUESTION: Just out of curiosity, are you a member of
the New York Bar?
PROFESSOR FREEDMAN: Yes. I was sworn into the New York
Bar in 1978. There was a room full of people-it was about this size-a
room full of young lawyers. And the first thing they had us do was
commit perjury. The presiding judge said, "I want each of you to raise
your hand and swear that you have read the New York Code of
Professional Responsibility and understand it." I was probably the only
one who had read the whole thing, but I could not honestly say that I
understood it. But I lied along with everybody else, because I was not
going to fail to become a member of the Bar at the last minute like that.
AUDIENCE QUESTION: Do you think there is any difference
between the litigation and nonlitigation context? Imagine that in a
transaction there is a document the lawyer receives that contains
metadata. The idea of searching for the truth is a little different in that
context when you see the analysis being made.
PROFESSOR FREEDMAN: Good point. First, I think that a lawyer
is always in an adversarial position in our constitutionalized adversary
system. Regardless of whether you are drafting a contract, writing a
will, negotiating, or whatever it may be, you are dealing with an
adversary and with potential litigation over that contract, over that will,
over the advice you give. So the idea that you are only an adversary if
you are in litigation, I think it is wrong.
Beyond that, you still have the agency issue, and you still have your
fiduciary obligations to your client. You still have no attorney-client
privilege or confidentiality with the party on the other side. And here
is an interesting variation on that theme. I have seen this happen.
David Hricik mentions it in one of his articles in this area. The
metadata or the misdirected fax was sent on purpose. The e-mail says
we will not settle for a penny more than $100,000. My client is
absolutely firm on that. And the metadata shows that it originally said
$150,000. That case was shortly thereafter settled for $150,000. But I
happen to know it was sent on purpose. So that can happen, too.
With regard to lawyers succumbing to the conflict of interest of what
goes around comes around, I remember when I was in law school there
was a case where an ophthalmologist wanted to dilate a boy's eyes but
the drops he put in were not dilation drops, they were acid, and he
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blinded him. Back then the lawyer who represented the boy had to go
to Europe to find a doctor who would testify that that was not reasonably skilled and competent practice. He could not find a doctor in the
United States who would testify. Doctors testifying against doctors is a
relatively recent thing. And I remember raising that case with a doctor
friend of mine. His response was, "What goes around comes around.
You don't mess in your own yard. If I do that, then somebody might do
it to me." In addition, the price of doing it back then was that the doctor
who testified would lose his hospital privileges. Is that really professionalism under any rational definition? But that is what we are talking
about. We are talking about professionalism meaning taking care of
each other ahead of your fiduciary responsibility to your client, your
loyalty to your client. We are talking about protecting each other from
potential malpractice.
There is something else that I would not object to, but I have never
had a lawyer pick up on this. That is, put into your retainer agreement
and make sure your client understands that you might get information
that could win your case for the client but that if using it would be
embarrassing or risk malpractice on the part of the lawyer on the other
side, you would not use it. That is the kind of lawyer I am. I think the
client is entitled to know in advance if there's going to be a limit on your
fiduciary obligation and on your loyalty.
AUDIENCE QUESTION: The Coleman decision-the death penalty
case you talked about-has such a strong view of agency, and given that
I think your position on what you're talking about tonight is unassailable, but I happen to think that Coleman is wrongly decided, that
Coleman should not have been fatally bound by his lawyer's negligence.
PROFESSOR FREEDMAN: As you might suspect, I agree with you
very strongly. It is one of Justice O'Connor's more outrageous opinions.
Contrary to the mythology that has developed, I think that she is a cruel
and unprincipled person. Of course, that is a whole other issue.
AUDIENCE QUESTION: If you are the receiving lawyer of the
metadata or the misdirected communication, and you are terribly
unimpressed with the ethical responsibility to return it to the other side,
do you not violate your obligation to your client by communicating with
the court rather than just using it?
PROFESSOR FREEDMAN: Oh, yes, that's what I said. That is not
what I favor, but my view of the proper outcome is not my client in that
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case. My client is the lawyer who has called me, and my job is to keep
that lawyer out of trouble.
AUDIENCE QUESTION: That is, when the receiving lawyer retains
you for advice?
PROFESSOR FREEDMAN: Yes, although I do not take retainers
anymore. All I do now is death penalty and Guantanamo cases.
AUDIENCE QUESTION: If you are the lawyer receiving the data
and you did not retain Monroe Freedman for advice, would you feel like
you simply had to use it rather than send it to the court for a decision?
PROFESSORFREEDMAN: Yes, but if I were in a jurisdiction where
that was risky, at the very least I would talk to my client about it and
see if I could get the client to agree with sending it to the court. That
might well have advantages for the client, because if I should go ahead
in the way I think proper, and the judge then got angry about it, as the
judge could, the repercussions could not only be against me but against
my client. So there is a very good chance that the client would agree to
sending it to the court.
PROFESSORLONGAN: We'll have a lot of time tomorrow to pursue
these and other issues. I would like to thank you again.

